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Abstract—As the communication network is in transition
towards a commercial one controlled by service providers (SP) ,
the present paper considers a pricing game in a communication
market covered by several wireless access points sharing the
same spectrum and analyzes two business models: monopoly (APs
controlled by one SP) and oligopoly (APs controlled by different
SPs). We use a Stackelberg game to model the problem: SPs
are the leader(s) and end users are the followers. We prove,
under certain conditions, the existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium for both models and derive their expressions. In
order to compare the impact of different business models on
social welfare and SPs’ profits, we define two metrics: PoCS (price
of competition on social welfare) and PoCP (price of competition
on profits). For symmetric cross-AP interferences, the tight lower
bound of PoCS is 3/4, and that of PoCP is 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Resource allocation is a basic issue in communication net-
works. Decentralized resource allocation has gained extensive
attention [1], in which the majority of relevant works treated
end users and service providers (SPs) as self-centric agents
making decisions to maximize their own utilities. Prices,
which are set by SPs, act as the bridge between end users
and SPs: SPs set proper prices for the services they provide to
achieve network improvement, fairness of resource allocation
[2] or maximization of profits [3]; on the other hand, end users
choose the proper services that maximize their own utilities
based on charged prices and the corresponding QoS.
For wired access networks, pricing models have received
extensive research in recent years [4] [2]. The congestion
condition of a transmission link in wired networks only
depends on the flows it carries. As shown in previous works,
the pricing problem can be converted to convex optimization
problems and can be analyzed using convex analysis tech-
niques. For wireless access networks, however, the study is
relatively limited. A main obstacle in wireless access networks
is the broadcast nature of wireless medium which induces
interferences, thus bringing new challenges to the pricing
analysis: congestion is not only caused by the users from the
same access network, but also from other networks nearby.
As a consequence, pricing models in wireless access networks
have mainly concentrated on new scenarios arising from new
elements introduced besides the existing networks, such as
femtocell [5], WiFi and WiMAX [6], thus to some extent
avoiding the treatment of interference. In [7], the authors ana-
lyzed the competition between wireless service providers with
context similar to us. However, they assumed that the resources
among the SPs are orthogonal and SPs are free from cross-
AP interferences. As a consequence, the result that competition
among SPs leads to a globally optimal outcome may no longer
be valid when cross-AP interferences are considered. The work
in [8] took an initial attempt to analyzing a duopoly pricing
model when the interferences among the SPs are not neglected.
However, therein the amount of interferences among the SPs
are always assumed equal, an assumption overly restrictive
for realistic applications. As another limitation in general,
most of existing studies only considers the monopoly case
or the duopoly case, individually, seldom comparing the two
business models together. Consequently, the purpose of our
study in this paper is twofold. First, we aim to develop a
general framework for analyzing pricing in wireless access
networks, with interferences taken into consideration. Second,
we aim to compare the impacts of monopoly and duopoly on
social welfare and SPs’ profits.
In this paper, we propose a general pricing model for multi-
ple wireless APs, which may be viewed as a generalization of
a wired access pricing model [9]. We consider a hotspot with a
large number of end users covered by several APs sharing the
same radio band. We adopt a market demand function to cap-
ture user heterogeneity in their willingness-to-pay and examine
two business models: monopoly and duopoly, respectively. We
formulate such a pricing model as a Stackelberg game: SPs
are the leader(s) and end users are the followers, and further
use Wardrop’s principle to describe users’ distribution on APs.
We establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria of
the game for both cases and further analytically characterize
the equilibria and the corresponding user distributions, under
linear demand function and cross-AP interferences model.
In order to compare the impacts of monopoly and duopoly
on social welfare and SPs’ profits, we define two metrics:
PoCS (price of competition on social welfare) which is the
ratio of social welfare of monopoly to that of duopoly, and
PoCP (price of competition on profits) which is the ratio of
profits of monopoly to the sum profits of duopoly. Then for
symmetric cross-AP interferences, we establish that PoCS is
lower bounded by 3/4 and PoCP lower bounded by 1, while
both of them are unbounded from above.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the system model, formulating wireless
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APs’ pricing problem as a Stackelberg game and setting basic
assumptions for subsequent analysis. Section III establishes
the existence and uniqueness of user distribution equilibrium
following Wardrop’s principle for a given price profile. Section
IV analyzes the price equilibria of both monopoly and duopoly
models, as well as the corresponding user distributions. Sec-
tion V introduces the concepts of PoCS and PoCP, and
analyzes their bounds. Section VI provides some numerical
illustrations of our analysis. Finally Section VII concludes this
paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. General Model
Suppose that there is a hotspot covered by N wireless APs
which provide access services for a large number of end users.
Each AP has an access price pi, i ∈ N, and the users must
take payments before use. Let xi denote the flow carried on
APi and x = [x1, ..., xN ] denote the vector of flows of all
APs. As the congestion level of each AP is related to the flow
it serves and that of other APs (due to the broadcast nature of
wireless channel), we denote each AP’s congestion function
as li(x). Note that the game we considered in this paper is
in large time scale and the congestion function only reflects
an averaged congestion level. Then we define the disutility of
accessing APi as the sum of pi and li(x), i.e., di , pi+ li(x)
(implicitly assuming that all users trade off time and money
identically [9]). The users are selfish and would access the
APs with the least disutility, so the disutility of the market
can be expressed as d , mini di. Because the value of the
wireless access service is different for different users, we use
a market demand function D(·) to capture this heterogeneity
in their willingness-to-pay. For convenience, we consider the
inverse of the demand function u(x) , D−1(x), where x =∑
i xi. We naturally assume that D(·) is decreasing due to the
law of demand [10] which indicates that the total flow of the
users is decreasing with the disutility of the market increasing.
We further assume that the number of end users is large and
each single user’s impact on the whole system is negligible,
i.e., any user’s switching from one AP to another AP does
not change the congestion situations of all APs. Thus we can
use Wardrop’s principle [11] to describe users’ distribution on
all APs. Formally, we define Wardrop equilibrium (WE) as
follows.
Definition 1 (Wardrop Equilibrium): Given a set of prices
of all APs, p, a flow distribution xWE forms a WE if it
satisfies:
1) ∀xWEi > 0, di = pi + li(xWE) = u(
∑
j
xWEj ); (1)
2) ∀xWEi = 0, di = pi + li(xWE) ≥ u(
∑
j
xWEj ). (2)
We define the profits of APi as pixi and consumers’ surplus
as
∫ u−1(d)
0
(u(x)−d)dx. Then the social welfare is defined as the
sum of APs’ profits and consumers’ surplus, and can further
be written as (at a WE):
SW(xWE) =
∫ ∑
j x
WE
j
0
u(x)dx−
∑
j
xWEj lj(x
WE). (3)
When there exist only two APs, see Figure (1) for an
illustration.
Fig. 1. Illustration of system model for two-AP case
We formulate this wireless APs pricing model as a Stack-
elberg game: SPs are the leader(s) and they set prices for the
APs first; end users are the followers, they decide whether or
not to accept the services and if they do, further decide which
APs to access. When all the APs are controlled by a single
SP, we have a monopoly market; when the APs are owned
by different SPs, we have an oligopoly market. We define
monopoly equilibrium (ME) and oligopoly equilibrium (OE)
as follows.
Definition 2 (Monopoly Equilibrium): A set of prices of all
APs, pME, forms an ME, when it satisfies:
pME ∈ argmax
p
∑
i∈I
pix
WE
i (p). (4)
Definition 3 (Oligopoly Equilibrium): A set of prices of all
APs, pOE, forms an OE, when for any SPi, the price satisfies:
pOEi ∈ arg max
pi,pOE−i
pix
WE
i (pi,p
OE
−i ). (5)
B. An SINR Example
A concrete example which motivates and also illustrates
the aforementioned general system model is a simple N -AP
uplink wireless access network. Assume that all users’ average
transmit power level is a common constant P , and that the
frequency-flat channel gains of all the user links connecting
to the same AP are also identical (averaged in large time scale).
Suppose that the average number of users served by APi is
Xi and the channel gain from the users of APj to that of
APi is gj,i . We focus on the scenario where the number of
users is large, and thus the noise as well as each single user’s
impact on SINR are negligible. Thus the average signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at APi is expressed as
(with bandwidth normalized)
SINRi
.
=
gi,iP
N + gi,iPXi +
∑
j 6=i gj,iPXj
.
=
gi,i
gi,iXi +
∑
j 6=i gj,iXj
. (6)
When considering a coding scheme using random Gaussian
codebooks and single-user decoding treating interference as
noise, a typical user connecting to APi achieves rate (normal-
ized) ri = log(1+SINRi). Since when the number of users is
large and the SINR is low,we have ri ≈ SINRi/ ln 2. Let each
user transmit (on average) a fixed amount µ of information bits
for accessing an AP. As a result, the averaged delay a typical
user of APi experiences is
li(X1, · · · , XN ) = µ
ri
= µ
gi,iXi +
∑
j 6=i gj,iXj
gi,i
ln 2. (7)
We then define xi , µXi ln 2 as the aggregated flow carried
on APi, and make the substitutions ∀j 6= i, g˜j,i , gj,i/gi,i
and g˜i,i = 1 (G = [g˜i,j ]i,j). Thus the disutility of accessing
APi is
di = pi +
∑
j
g˜j,ixj . (8)
Remark 1: In the SINR example above, the linear structure
of the disutility function mainly results from two assumptions:
(1) the problem is considered in a large time scale, and
hence the fading effect of wireless channel can be averaged
and users’ consumption behavior can accord to some market
demand curve; (2) end users are gathered, and hence their
channels to an AP are homogeneous in the long run. However,
as we shall see in the subsequent analysis, the problem is
still complicated because both the pricing strategy of SPs
and accessing AP strategy of users are intertwined due to
the presence of interference, and the solution to the problem
exhibits interesting behavior.
III. WARDROP EQUILIBRIUM FOR USERS
In this section, we begin with a study on the existence and
uniqueness of user distribution equilibrium, i.e., WE, and we
analyze the characteristics of WE.
A. Existence of Wardrop Equilibrium
Borrowing ideas from proofs in [12], we establish the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Existence of WE): For any given positive
prices (p1, · · · , pN ), if the inverse of the user demand
function u(x) is continuous, bounded, non-negative and
decreasing, and ∀i, li(x) is continuous and satisfies
li(x) ≥ xi, then there exits xWE constituting a WE.
Proof: From Definition 1, conditions (1) and (2) of WE
can be written in the form of a nonlinear complementarity
problem (NCP), i.e., for ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, xWE satisfies:{
xWEi [pi + li(x
WE)− u(∑j xWEj )] = 0
xWEi ≥ 0, pi + li(xWE)− u(
∑
j x
WE
j )] ≥ 0.
(9)
We construct a mapping φ = (φ1, · · · , φN ), where
φi(x
WE) = [xWEi − Fi(xWE)]+, Fi(xWE) , pi + li(xWE)−
u(
∑
j x
WE
j ) and [x]
+ = max{x, 0}. From [12, Thm. 5.3], the
existence of the solution of NCP is equivalent to the existence
of a fixed point of the mapping φ = (φ1, · · · , φN ). Under
the conditions ∀i, li(xWE) ≥ xWEi and u(·) a decreasing
function, for ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, we have xWEi − Fi(xWE) ≤
u(0). As a result, for all ∀xWE ∈ [0, u(0)]N , we have
φ(xWE) ∈ [0, u(0)]N . Applying Brouwer fixed-point theorem,
at least one fixed point x∗ exists and the corresponding WE
is just xWE = x∗.
Clearly the delay function li(·) in (8) of the SINR example
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1, and thus the existence
of WE therein is guaranteed.
B. Uniqueness of Wardrop Equilibrium
For establishing the uniqueness of WE, we focus on linear
environment, i.e., two linear conditions (LC):
LC1: congestion function li(x) has a linear structure, li(x) =∑
j g˜j,ixj (∀i, j, g˜i,j > 0);
LC2: the inverse of the user demand function is linear, u(x) =
w − sx (w, s > 0).
We rewrite the WE conditions (1) and (2) in a compact form
(for compactness of representation, we will use x instead of
xWE) as
x ≥ 0 (10)
Mx+ q ≥ 0 (11)
xT (Mx+ q) = 0 (12)
where M = GT + 1sT , s = [s, · · · , s]T , w = [w, · · · , w]T ,
p = [p1, · · · , pN ]T and q = p−w. The conditions above form
a linear complementarity problem (LCP) and we can utilize
some existing results as follows.
Definition 4 (P-Matrix): A square matrix M is called a P-
matrix if all its principal sub-determinants are strictly positive.
Lemma 1 (Uniqueness of LCP): [13, Thm. 4.2] The system
(10)-(12) has a unique solution for each q ∈ RN if and only
if M is a P-matrix.
In the case considered in this article, the unique solution
of LCP (10)-(12) corresponds to the unique WE. In many
situations, the interferences among the APs are weak, and
thus it motivates us to examine if some “weak interference”
condition can lead to the uniqueness of WE.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness of WE): Under the assumptions of
LC1 and LC2, for any given non-negative prices (p1, · · · , pN ),
if the cross-AP interferences are weak, i.e., ∀i, ∑j 6=i(g˜i,j +
g˜j,i) < 2g˜i,i, then WE exists and is unique.
Proof: From Gersˇgorin’s discs theorem (see, e.g., [14]),
the condition
∑
j 6=i(g˜i,j + g˜j,i) < 2g˜i,i implies that all the
eigenvalues of the symmetric matrix (G+GT )/2 are positive
and hence (G+GT )/2 is a positive-definite matrix. Because
∀x ∈ RN , we have xT1sTx = s(∑i xi)2 ≥ 0. Thus we have
∀x ∈ RN , xT ((G+GT )/2)x+xT (1sT )x > 0, i.e., xT (M +
MT )/2x = xTMx > 0. Therefore, M is a positive-definite
matrix and then a P-matrix. Using Lemma 1, we complete the
proof.
To simplify the analysis, we will only focus on weak cross-
AP interferences throughout the remaining analysis of this
paper.
C. Characterization of Wardrop Equilibrium for Two APs
From the analysis above, we get a clear picture about the
number of WEs when the interferences between APs are weak.
But when the interferences become strong, how things would
be like? In the following, we will analyze a two-AP case to
illustrate under assumption LC1 only and try to gain some
insights into this problem.
At first, we study how to determine WE given the price
vector p = (p1, p2) of SPs. Without loss of generality
(WLOG), we assume that p1 < p2, and the analysis when
p1 ≥ p2 is similar. We will divide our analysis into three cases.
For convenience, we use substitutions a2 , g˜2,1, b1 , g˜1,2 and
g˜1,1 = g˜2,2 = 1.
(1) When p satisfies p1, p2 ≥ u(0), there is a unique WE
xWE1 = x
WE
2 = 0, which means that the prices set by the SPs
are so high that none of users has any incentive to access the
network for wireless services.
(2) When p satisfies p1 < u(0), p2 ≥ u(0), we have xWE2 = 0
and xWE1 satisfying x
WE
1 +p1 = u(x
WE
1 ). Because the left part
of the equation, xWE1 +p1, is monotonically increasing in x
WE
1
and the right part of the equation, u(xWE1 ), is monotonically
decreasing in xWE1 , they must have a single intersection point,
and the WE is unique.
(3) When p satisfies 0 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ u(0), the situation
becomes more involved. Under this condition, xWE1 and x
WE
2
cannot be zero simultaneously (which can be verified by
contradiction). Given the market disutility d, we define the
total demand function as f(d) ,
∑2
i=1 x
WE
i (d). Thus the
intersection point between u−1(d) and f(d) determines the
market disutility d at WE. As u−1(d) is a strictly decreasing
function in market disutility d, while f(d) is not always
increasing in d as we will see, there may exist multiple in-
tersection points between f(d) and u−1(d) which correspond
to multiple WEs. It is different from the results in [9] when
cross-AP interferences are not considered. In the sequel, we
study the analytical expressions of f(d) under different cases
for fixed disutility level.
1) When d satisfies 0 ≤ d ≤ p1, we have xWE1 = xWE2 = 0
(the disutility that end users can stand is smaller than
the lowest price, and thus no one would like to access
the network), and hence f(d) = 0;
2) When d satisfies p1 < d ≤ p2, we have xWE2 = 0 and
xWE1 = d−p1 (utilizing equation (1) and (2)) and hence
f(d) = d− p1;
3) When d satisfies p2 < d < u(0), there are three cases
depending on the strength of cross-AP interferences
(a2, b1).
a) If xWE1 > 0 and x
WE
2 > 0, the conditions of WE
are {
p1 + l1(x
WE) = d;
p2 + l2(x
WE) = d.
Thus we can derive user distributions between the
two APs as{
xWE1 =
(1−a2)d+a2p2−p1
1−a2b1 ;
xWE2 =
(1−b1)d+b1p1−p2
1−a2b1 .
Hence the cross-AP interferences region
{(a2, b1)|a2 < d−p1d−p2 , b1 <
d−p2
d−p1 or a2 >
d−p1
d−p2 , b1 >
d−p2
d−p1 } can lead to xWE1 > 0 and
xWE2 > 0. The total demand function is
f(d) =
(2− a2 − b1)d+ (a2 − 1)p2 + (b1 − 1)p1
1− a2b1 .
b) Similarly, if xWE1 > 0 and x
WE
2 = 0, then the
conditions of WE become{
p1 + l1(x
WE) = d;
p2 + l2(x
WE) ≥ d.
and we have xWE1 = d−p1. Cross-AP interferences
region should satisfy {(a2, b1)|b1 ≥ d−p2d−p1 } and the
total demand function is f(d) = d− p1.
c) If xWE1 = 0 and x
WE
2 > 0, we have x
WE
2 = d−p2
and cross-AP interferences region should satisfy
{(a2, b1)|a2 ≥ d−p1d−p2 }. The total demand function
is f(d) = d− p2.
To sum up, we divide cross-AP interferences region into
four sub-regions (see Figure (2)):
a) when (a2, b1) falls in region (I), we have
xWE1 > 0, x
WE
2 > 0 and f(d) =
(2−a2−b1)d+(a2−1)p2+(b1−1)p1
1−a2b1 ;
b) when (a2, b1) falls in region (II), we have xWE1 =
0, xWE2 > 0 and f(d) = d− p2;
c) when (a2, b1) falls in region (III), three cases exist:
• xWE1 > 0, x
WE
2 > 0 and f(d) =
(2−a2−b1)d+(a2−1)p2+(b1−1)p1
1−a2b1 ,
• or xWE1 = 0, x
WE
2 > 0 and f(d) = d− p2,
• or xWE1 > 0, x
WE
2 = 0 and f(d) = d− p1;
d) when (a2, b1) falls in region (IV), we have xWE1 >
0, xWE2 = 0 and f(d) = d− p1.
However, when market disutility d changes, the region that
(a2, b1) belongs to in Figure (2) also changes, we need to
have the region be further divided and the division should be
independent of market disutility d. Because the intersection
point of the four sub-regions in Figure (2) is
(
d−p1
d−p2 ,
d−p2
d−p1
)
,
when d increases from p2 to u(0), the intersection point moves
along the trajectory of a2b1 = 1, which enables us to further
divide the cross-AP interferences region into five sub-regions
(see Figure (3)). Due to aforementioned analysis, we are able
to get a detailed characterization of the total demand function
f(d) as follows:
1) when (a2, b1) falls in region (a) in Figure (3), i.e.,
{(a2, b1)|0 ≤ a2 < u(0)−p1u(0)−p2 , 0 ≤ b1 <
u(0)−p2
u(0)−p1 }, as
d increases from p2 to u(0), the region that (a2, b1)
belongs to in Figure (2) moves from region (IV) to
region (I), and thus we have
f(d) =

d− p1, when p2 < d ≤ p2−b1p11−b1 ;
(2−a2−b1)d+(a2−1)p2+(b1−1)p1
1−a2b1 ,
when p2−b1p11−b1 < d < u(0);
(13)
2) similarly, when (a2, b1) falls in region (b), i.e.,
{(a2, b1)|a2 ≥ u(0)−p1u(0)−p2 , 0 ≤ b1 ≤
u(0)−p2
u(0)−p1 , a2b1 < 1},
as d increases from p2 to u(0), it moves from region
(IV) to region (I) and finally moves to region (II), and
thus we have
f(d) =

d− p1, when p2 < d ≤ p2−b1p11−b1 ;
(2−a2−b1)d+(a2−1)p2+(b1−1)p1
1−a2b1 ,
when p2−b1p11−b1 < d <
p1−a2p2
1−a2 ;
d− p2, when p1−a2p21−a2 ≤ d < u(0);
(14)
3) when (a2, b1) falls in region (c), i.e., {(a2, b1)|a2 ≥
u(0)−p1
u(0)−p2 , 0 ≤ b1 ≤
u(0)−p2
u(0)−p1 , a2b1 > 1}, it moves from
region (IV) to region (III) and finally moves to region
(II), and thus we have
f(d) =

d− p1, when p2 < d ≤ p1−a2p21−a2 ;
(2−a2−b1)d+(a2−1)p2+(b1−1)p1
1−a2b1
or d− p1
or d− p2,
when p1−a2p21−a2 < d <
p2−b1p1
1−b1 ;
d− p2, when p2−b1p11−b1 ≤ d < u(0);
(15)
4) when (a2, b1) falls in region (d), i.e., {(a2, b1)|a2 >
u(0)−p1
u(0)−p2 , b1 >
u(0)−p2
u(0)−p1 }, it moves from region (IV) to
region (III), and thus we have
f(d) =

d− p1, when p2 < d ≤ p1−a2p21−a2 ;
(2−a2−b1)d+(a2−1)p2+(b1−1)p1
1−a2b1
or d− p1
or d− p2,
when p1−a2p21−a2 < d < u(0)
(16)
5) when (a2, b1) falls in region (e), i.e., {(a2, b1)|0 ≤ a2 <
u(0)−p1
u(0)−p2 , b1 >
u(0)−p2
u(0)−p1 }, as d increases from p2 to u(0),
(a2, b1) always stays in region (IV), and thus we have
f(d) = d− p1, when p2 < d < u(0). (17)
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Fig. 2. Cross-AP interferences sub-regions given market disutility d
Take part of region (b) for an illustration, see Figure
(4). When (a2, b1) ∈ {(a2, b1)|a2b1 < 1, a2 + b1 >
2}⋂ region (b), the total demand function f(d) decreases
in d when d falls in the interval (p2−b1p11−b1 ,
p1−a2p2
1−a2 ). It is a
very counter-intuitive result, since the increase of end users’
tolerance of the market disutility can lead to the decrease of
the number of end users. There may exist multiple WEs due
to the following two reasons:
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Fig. 3. General cross-AP interferences sub-regions
1) the interference regions involve region III when disutility
d varies (three cases can happen);
2) the interferences regions involve region I and (a2, b1)
falls in the region {(a2, b1)|a2b1 < 1, a2+ b1 > 2, a2 >
0, b1 > 0} (this is due to non-monotonicity of the total
flow).
Therefore, when we change the prices (p1, p2), as long as
a2 + b1 < 2, there exists a unique WE for all market
demand functions. This result coincides with Theorem 2, while
assumption LC2 is not required here.
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Fig. 4. An illustration when (a2, b1) falls in region (b)
IV. OLIGOPOLY ANALYSIS
Generally, the oligopoly analysis of this problem is complex
and intractable. In this section, in order to obtain analytical
results and gain insights, we focus on a two-AP case under
the linear assumptions (LC1, LC2) with weak cross-AP in-
terferences. Through the following analysis, we characterize
the APs’ prices and user distributions at both monopoly and
duopoly equilibria.
A. Monopoly Case
When the APs are controlled by one SP, the goal of the SP
is to maximize the total profits of the APs. We prove that when
there are only two APs and the interferences between them are
weak, the pricing strategy can be expressed analytically.
Price differentiation (PD) is a pricing strategy in which
an SP offers the same service or product at different prices
in different markets. PD can be a feature of monopolistic
and oligopolistic markets. By means of PD, SP can absorb
consumer’s surplus from the consumer to raise its revenue. If
PD is permitted, the problem can be formulated as
max
p
pTx (18)
s.t. LCP (10)− (12).
Theorem 3 (Monopoly Equilibrium with PD): Under the
assumptions of LC1 and LC2, when cross-AP interferences
are weak, i.e., a2 + b1 < 2, and the prices are differentiated,
ME exists and is unique. The corresponding prices are:
pME = (M−1 + (M−1)T )−1M−1w (19)
Meanwhile the user distributions between the APs are:
xME =M−1(I − (M−1 + (M−1)T )−1M−1)w (20)
Proof: Firstly, we prove by contradiction that both
APs have positive demands, i.e., xWE1 (p
ME) > 0 and
xWE2 (p
ME) > 0. WLOG, suppose that at the ME, we have
xWE1 = 0 and x
WE
2 > 0, the corresponding disutility is
d∗. From the WE constraints d∗ = w − sxWE2 , we get
xWE2 = (w − d∗)/s. Thus the cost due to delay is (xWE2 )2 =
((w − d∗)/s)2. Under the same degree of the disutility d∗, if
there exists p1 and p2 that can make xWE1 > 0 x
WE
2 > 0, then
the congestion cost incurred is
(xWE1 + a2x
WE
2 )x
WE
1 + (x
WE
2 + b1x
WE
1 )x
WE
2 (21)
= (xWE1 + x
WE
2 )
2 − (2− a2 − b1)xWE1 xWE2 (22)
= ((w − d∗)/s)2 − (2− a2 − b1)xWE1 xWE2 (23)
< ((w − d∗)/s)2, (24)
which means that SP can get more profits if both of the APs
are at work. From Figure (3), when d∗ is fixed, as long as
a2 + b1 < 2, we can tune the prices p1 p2 that make (a2, b1)
falls in region (I). Thus both APs have positive demands and
the constraints of the problem become Mx + q = 0. It is
a non-constrained convex optimization problem and can be
easily solved.
Otherwise, without PD, the problem is to solve
max
p
p1Tx (25)
s.t. LCP (10)− (12),
and we have the following result.
Theorem 4 (Monopoly Equilibrium without PD): Under
the assumptions of LC1 and LC2, when cross-AP interferences
are weak, i.e., a2+b1 < 2, and the prices are not differentiated,
ME exists and is unique. The corresponding prices are:
pME = w/2. (26)
Meanwhile the user distributions between the APs are:
xME =M−1w/2. (27)
Proof: When p1 = p2 is considered, it is a special case of
Figure(2). The region {(a2, b1)|0 ≤ a2, b1 < 1} corresponds
both of the APs have positive flow, the region {(a2, b1)|a2 ≥
1, b1 ≤ 1, a2+b1 < 2} corresponds to xWE2 > 0 xWE1 = 0 and
the region {(a2, b1)|a2 ≤ 1, b1 ≥ 1, a2 + b1 < 2} corresponds
to xWE1 > 0 x
WE
2 = 0. We prove by classified discussions.
(1) When a2 ≤ 1, b1 ≤ 1, since both APs have positive flows,
the constraints of WE reduce to Mx+q = 0. Thus the profit
of SP is p1T (M−1(w−p1)) and SP can get its optimal profit
by setting the price as pWE = w/2.
(2) When a2 ≥ 1, b1 ≤ 1, a2 + b1 < 2, we have xWE2 > 0
xWE1 = 0. Thus the profit of SP is px
WE
2 . Since w− sxWE2 =
p + xWE2 , the profit can be expressed as p(w − p)/(s + 1)
and SP can also get its optimal profit by setting the price as
pWE = w/2. The discussion of the other case is similar. Thus
we complete the proof.
This result is interesting because when the prices are not
differentiated, the SP simply sets pME = w/2 regardless of
the interferences between the APs.
B. Duopoly Case
When the APs are controlled by different SPs, the goal
of each SP is to maximize his own profits. Similar to the
monopoly case, we prove that each SP’s profit-maximizing
problem can be solved analytically when there only exist two
APs.
For each SP, its optimization problem given the price of the
other SP p−i can be expressed as
max
pi
pixi (28)
s.t. LCP (10)− (12).
The following theorem characterizes SPs’ pricing strategies.
Theorem 5 (Duopoly Equilibrium): Under the assumptions
of LC1 and LC2, when the cross-AP interferences are weak,
i.e., 0 ≤ a2 + b1 < 2, for each SPi, the best pricing strategy
is dependent on the cross-AP interference stated as follows.
1) When the cross-AP interferences satisfy 0 ≤ a2 ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ a2 ≤ 1, DE exists and is unique, and the pricing
strategies are:{
p∗1 =
w[(a2+s)(1−b1)+2(1−a2)(1+s)]
4(1+s)2−(s+a2)(s+b1) ,
p∗2 =
w[(b1+s)(1−a2)+2(1−b1)(1+s)]
4(1+s)2−(s+a2)(s+b1) ;
(29)
meanwhile the user distributions between the APs are:{
x∗1 =
(w−p∗1)(1+s)−(w−p∗2)(a2+s)
(1+s)2−(s+a2)(s+b1) ,
x∗2 =
(w−p∗2)(1+s)−(w−p∗1)(b1+s)
(1+s)2−(s+a2)(s+b1) .
(30)
2) When the cross-AP interferences satisfy a2 > 1, 0 ≤
b1 < 1 and a2 + b2 < 2, the pricing strategies are:{
if p∗2x
∗
2 >
(a2−1)w2
(s+a2)2
, pDE2 = p
∗
2, p
DE
1 = p
∗
1,
if p∗2x
∗
2 ≤ (a2−1)w
2
(s+a2)2
, pDE2 =
(a2−1)w
s+a2
, pDE1 ≥ 0.
3) When the cross-AP interferences satisfy b1 > 1, 0 ≤
a2 < 1 and a2 + b2 < 2, the pricing strategies are:{
if p∗1x
∗
1 >
(b1−1)w2
(s+b1)2
, pDE1 = p
∗
1, p
DE
2 = p
∗
2,
if p∗1x
∗
1 ≤ (b1−1)w
2
(s+b1)2
, pDE1 =
(b1−1)w
s+b1
, pDE2 ≥ 0.
Proof:
1) When the cross-AP interferences satisfy 0 ≤ a2 ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ a2 ≤ 1, WLOG, we assume x1 = 0 and x2 > 0, and thus
we have d1 ≥ d2 (WE condition), i.e., p1 + a2x2 ≥ p2 + x2.
SP1 can always lower the price p1 it charges to gain positive
profits. Thus both SPs can get positive profits and flow. Solving
problem (28), the best-response function of SP1 is :
BR1(p2) = max
{
min
{
(a2 + s)p2 + w(1− a2)
2(1 + s)
, u(0)
}
, 0
}
and that of SP2 is:
BR2(p1) = max
{
min
{
(b1 + s)p1 + w(1− b1)
2(1 + s)
, u(0)
}
, 0
}
Because of x1 > 0 and x2 > 0, DE cannot be obtained at the
boundaries of both best-response functions, i.e., ∀i ∈ {1, 2},
pi 6= 0, u(0). Thus DE is determined by the intersection point
of the two best-response functions’ linear part and we get the
prices pDE and user distributions between SPs xWE(pDE) at
DE.
2) When the cross-AP interferences satisfy a2 > 1, 0 ≤
b1 < 1 and a2 + b2 < 2, SP2 has the power to expel SP1
from the market. When SP1 is expelled from market, we have
x1 = 0 and x2 > 0, as the analysis above, the price of SP2
should satisfy p2 ≤ (a2 − 1)x2 to guarantee that no matter
how much SP1 charges, no users would choose it for service.
It follows that d2 = w − sx2 = p2 + x2, hence the profit of
SP2 is p2(w−p2)/(s+1). If there is no constraint of p2, then
SP2 can get its optimal profit by setting p2 = w/2. However,
as we have the constraint p2 ≤ (a2 − 1)x2 which implies
that p2 ≤ (a2 − 1)w/(s + a2) < w/2, SP2 have to set the
price as p2 = (a2 − 1)w/(s+ a2) to get the maximum profit
(a2 − 1)w2/(s+ a2)2. When the two SPs coexists, the profit
of SP2 is p∗2x
∗
2 and SP2 would choose the price that achieves
the optimal profit.
3) When the cross-AP interferences satisfy b1 > 1, 0 ≤
a2 < 1 and a2 + b2 < 2, the analysis is similar to 2).
V. COMPARISON OF MONOPOLY AND DUOPOLY
In this section, following the assumptions of Section IV, we
further specialize to the case where cross-AP interferences are
symmetric, i.e., 0 ≤ a2 = b1 < 1.
A. Price of Competition on Social Welfare
In order to compare the impacts of monopoly and duopoly
on social welfare, we define the price of competition on social
welfare (PoCS) as:
PoCS =
SW(xWE(pME))
SW(xWE(pDE))
(31)
We study the properties of PoCS and the results are sum-
marized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Bound on PoCS): Under the assumptions of
LC1 and LC2 with weak and symmetric cross-AP interfer-
ences, a lower bound of PoCS is 34 and this bound is tight
in that it is attained when the elasticity of market demand
function, i.e., 1s , approaches zero. On the other hand, PoCS
is unbounded from above.
Proof: Using the results of Theorem 3 and Theorem 5,
we obtain the analytical expression of PoCS as
PoCS =
(3s+ 1 + a2)(s+ 2− a2)2
4(s+ 1)(s2 + 3s+ 1− 2a2s− a22)
(32)
Then it is easy to verify that PoCS − 34 ≥ 0 and
lims→∞ PoCS = 34 . When the elasticity of market demand
1
s
approaches to infinity and cross-AP interferences approach to
1, we have lims→0+,a2→1− PoCS(a2, s) = ∞, which means
that PoCS is unbounded from above.
B. Price of Competition on Profits
In order to compare the impacts of monopoly and duopoly
on SPs’ profits, we define the price of competition on profits
(PoCP) as
PoCP =
∑
i p
ME
i x
WE
i (p
ME)∑
i p
DE
i x
WE
i (p
DE)
. (33)
Using the results of Theorem 3 and 5, we obtain
PoCP =
(s− a2 + 2)2
4(1− a2)(s+ 1) (34)
We can then verify that PoCP−1 ≥ 0 and lims,a2→0 PoCP =
1, so we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7 (Lower bound of PoCP): Under the assump-
tions of LC1 and LC2 with weak and symmetric cross-AP
interferences, a lower bound of PoCP is 1 and this bound is
tight in that is attained when the elasticity of market demand
function, i.e. 1s , diverges and cross-AP interferences approach
zero. On the other hand, PoCP is unbounded from above.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we perform some numerical experiments to
illustrate the analysis in Section IV and Section V.
Firstly, we study the relationship between the equilibrium
prices and cross-AP interferences. We set w = s = 1, b1 =
0.3 and vary a2 from 0 to 1.7, then we get the variations of
prices, user distributions and the profits of APs at ME and DE,
respectively (see Figure (5)). From the figure, we can see that
the prices at ME are always higher than those of DE which
accords with our intuitive ideas. As a2 increases, SP increases
AP2’s access price to control the flow amount, thus limiting
the cross-AP interference from AP2 to AP1; while at DE, SP2
even continues to reduce AP2’s price, which aggravates SP1’s
situation. Interestingly, at ME, the monopolistic SP prefers to
equalize the user distributions between two APs.
Then we study PoCS and PoCP for both symmetric and
asymmetric cases. We set s equal to 0.1, 1 and 10, respectively,
vary a2 from 0 to 1 and get the PoCS and PoCP variation
tendencies (see Figure (6)). From Figure (6a), we find that
when the elasticity of market demand equals 1 and the
symmetric cross-AP interferences are less than 0.7, duopoly is
more favorable than monopoly from the point of view of social
welfare. However, when the symmetric cross-interferences are
strong, monopoly is more favorable than monopoly from the
point of view of both social welfare and SPs’ profits.
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Fig. 5. AP prices, user distributions and profits at equilibria
VII. CONCLUSION
Through the analysis in this paper, we find that when there
exist cross-AP interferences in the system, the performance
of monopoly is guaranteed from both the perspectives of
social welfare and profits. Indeed, as cross-AP interferences
become strong, the penalty due to competition on both social
welfare and SPs’ profits become large and even unbounded.
Such results shed new light on understanding the role of
competition and efficiency in wireless SP markets, where
cross-AP interferences are inevitable.
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